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THE BOUNDS OF PROFESSIONALISM:
CHALLENGING OUR STUDENTS;
CHALLENGING OURSELVES
BEVERLY BALOS*
Professor Aiken, in her article Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness,
and Morality," recognizes the importance of integrating the "analysis
of difference into traditional courses to ensure that students begin the
life-long process of examining their exercise of privilege and develop
an appreciation of the professional value of striving for justice, fair-
ness, and morality."1 Her article sets out a pedagogical approach to
legal education with the goal of constructing a learning experience
that maximizes reflection and unmasks privilege. Aiken's article raises
important issues for all of us concerned with legal education and the
competent representation of clients.
Focusing first on the clinical setting, Aiken analyzes her students'
experiences and how they affect client representation. She relies on
the diverse realities that contribute to the social construction of
knowledge to show how students' experiences affect their values and
how these experiences and values in turn affect the students' assess-
ment of the law. She explores the constraints that students' assump-
tions and attitudes impose upon their ability to assess the law and the
ways in which they view the facts of a case and the merits of a client's
claims.2 Aiken then describes the opportunities for clinical students to
* Visiting Clinical Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Vaughan G. Papke Clinical
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1 Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness, and Morality," 4 CLIN. L.
REv. 1, 63 (1997). It is important to acknowledge that law students will be situated within
different social categories and that we must be careful not to make assumptions about the
class, race, sexual orientation, ethnicity, or ability of our students. Students will have a
dominant position with respect to some categories and a subordinate position with respect
to other categories. The social categories of race, gender, sexual orientation, and class that
are the primary focus of Aiken's article operate simultaneously as interlocking systems of
oppression. Patricia Hill Collins has analyzed what she terms the matrix of domination to
explain that all groups possess varying amounts of penalty and privilege. An individual
may be privileged with respect to one category and penalized with respect to another.
PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT (1990).
2 A number of legal educators attempt to illustrate this point for their students by
showing a film titled A JURY OF HER PEERS (Texture Films, 1981). The film is based on a
short story written by Susan Glaspell in 1916. A play version titled TRIFLES was also writ-
ten at the same time. The film illustrates the limitations in perception and vision of officials
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begin to recognize that their assumptions about the legal system may
not in fact apply to everyone. She explains how "clinical legal educa-
tion increases the possibility for disorienting moments."'3 Aiken would
have students adopt a framework of analysis that questions beliefs and
assumptions. Additionally, Aiken would have the students be mindful
that they always are operating from a position of limited knowledge.
Aiken goes on to describe the difficulties encountered in teaching
about justice in the traditional classroom.4 While recognizing the ob-
stacles encountered in the traditional classroom, she urges us to use
innovative teaching techniques to maximize the possibility that stu-
dents will begin to understand that "unexamined perspective rein-
forces the status quo at the expense of many people."'5
Aiken's work allows us to reflect further on the structure of legal
education and its deficiencies in training students in the legal profes-
sion. One set of questions prompted by Aiken's analysis of both
clinical and nonclinical teaching approaches is: How do we break
down the clinical/nonclinical dichotomy? What do clinicians and
nonclinicians have at stake in keeping that dichotomy and what effect
does it have on our students, legal education, and the legal profession?
If one seeks, as Aiken does, to help students develop the skills and
values needed to become effective lawyers, one must consider
whether this goal is attainable within a structure of legal education
that perpetuates the clinical/nonclinical dichotomy.
A related issue that is kindled by Aiken's article is how the
boundaries that define the differences between clinical and nonclinical
education and between professional and nonprofessional are sympto-
matic of the larger problem of how the legal profession defines itself.
Aiken demonstrates how our own experiences limit what we can
know. The recognition that our knowledge is limited, partial, and con-
tingent contradicts the prevailing "myth" of the lawyer as expert "who
can and should determine, in a detached and rational manner, and
with minimal client input, what solution is best."'6 Thus we are left
with a tension within legal education and lawyering that may be un-
resolvable. Aiken's piece is a challenge to us to reimagine the legal
profession and our identity as lawyers. Only if we are able to accept
investigating the murder of an abusive husband allegedly committed by his wife. The limi-
tations portrayed in the film are due to the officials' biases and preconceived assumptions
about what is important, what constitutes facts, and what might serve as evidence.
3 Aiken, supra note 1, at 37.
4 Id. at 47.
5 Id. at 48.
6 DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS As COUNSELORS
17-18 (1991).
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that challenge is it going to be possible to restructure and rethink the
way each of us approaches legal education.
Lawyers and Clients
The legal profession is a relational one. Obligation to others is a
dominant feature of legal practice. The lawyer is both "other-regard-
ing and self-regarding"... ..7 The "others" who give rise to this obliga-
tion are diverse and have multiple roles in the legal system. They may
include clients, opposing counsel, judges, and third parties. There may
also be obligations to the broader concept of the administration of
justice and society in general.
For the vast majority of students who go on to practice law after
graduation, the lawyer/client relationship is central to lawyering and
their identity as lawyers. It is clear, however, that the lawyer/client
relationship is fraught with ambiguities and tension because the law-
yer is operating under the "myth" of expert but in fact has limited
knowledge. These relational complexities go beyond what may be le-
gally required by codes or rules of professional conduct. An examina-
tion of the models developed in the legal literature to describe the
lawyer/client relationship reveals conflicting views and norms that em-
body tensions and contradictions within the boundaries that frame the
construction of lawyers' professional identity.
The most prevalently taught model in clinical education is termed
client-centered. In this model, the clients are urged to participate as
"partners" with the lawyer in the resolution of their legal problems.
The client also is encouraged to be the decision maker because the
lawyer recognizes that the client is in the best position to evaluate the
risks and benefits of any particular course of action and is in fact the
one who will enjoy or suffer the results of whatever action is chosen.8
One goal of the client-centered model is to maximize client autonomy.
This model contrasts with a more traditional one frequently found in
practice. The traditional model views the lawyer as the expert with
obscure knowledge that is neither accessible nor understandable to
the client. The expert model views clients as lacking sophistication,
too emotional, and unable to assess adequately the potential long-
7 Burnele V. Powell, Lawyer Professionalism as Ordinary Morality, 35 S. TEX. L. REv.
275, 280 (1994) (noting that professionalism requires lawyers to view others in relational
terms and that to be a lawyer is by definition to be an instrumentality of society with
obligations to someone, and usually to more than one); see also Beth Nolan, Removing
Conflicts from the Administration of Justice: Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels
Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 GEO. L. J. 1, 36 n.155 (1990) (stating that conflict-
ing interests with which a lawyer must be concerned can be external and other-regarding,
or personal and self-regarding).
8 BINDER ET AL., supra note 6, at 20-21.
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term effects of decisions. 9 That view logically leads to the conclusion
that decision making is best left to the expert-the lawyer.10
That law students assimilate and are more comfortable with the
traditional all-knowing, expert model was illustrated starkly in a clinic
class I recently observed. The class examined the lawyer's role in
counseling a client. The reading material for the class consisted of ex-
cerpts from the widely used book, Lawyers as Counselors by David A.
Binder, Paul Bergman, and Susan C. Price, which adopts a client-cen-
tered approach to interviewing and counseling. The clinical faculty
teaching the class suggested to the students multiple goals for a coun-
seling session. They also described the lawyer's multiple functions in
counseling clients, including identifying the objectives of the client,
identifying and discussing with the client various options that will lead
to the achievement of the client's objectives, and engaging in a dia-
logue with the client regarding the consequences of those options so
that the client can reach a decision as to how to proceed in the case.
The students were then presented with a written transcript of a law-
yer/client counseling session. The transcript is a scene from the movie
The Good Mother, although in the transcript the names of the charac-
ters were changed so that the gender of the characters is not obvi-
ous.'1 The following is the transcript given to the students. I have
included specific pronouns so that the gender of the character in the
transcript is consistent with the gender of the character portrayed in
the film.
This is a custody case. The client has custody of Molly, an eight year
old girl. Lee is the client's lover who has been living with the client
and Molly for the past month. Molly found a magazine in the house
which had nude pictures of men and women in it. Molly showed the
magazine to Lee (the client was not at home at the time) who re-
sponded to various anatomical questions that Molly asked. Molly's
other parent, Sandy, was told of this "incident" by Molly and imme-
diately filed a petition for custody. The attorney has heard these
basic facts and is now discussing the case with the client-Molly's
0
9 Id. at 18.
10 Duncan Kennedy, in an essay about the role of legal education and its contribution
to the reproduction of hierarchies both in the legal profession and in society suggests that:
[T]here are different patterns of domination, mainly involving lawyers making deci-
sions for clients, where the client was perfectly capable of deciding on his own or her
own, in ways that make things easy for the lawyer, or profitable, or correspond to the
lawyer's own morality or preferences. As in corporate law, the whole thing is based
on excluding clients from knowledge they would need to decide on their own, while
at the same time mystifying that knowledge.
DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A Po-
LEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 40-41 (1983).
11 THE GOOD MOTHER (Touchstone Pictures, 1988).
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custodial parent, against whom the petition was brought.
A: Well, anything you want to tell me about your friend, Lee? Any
doubts about Lee? Any signs of aberrant behavior?
C: No. No, I mean-he's not a very conventional person, but I trust
Lee with Molly.
A: And so, it's just in this case, that you were misunderstood.
C: No, Lee was doing what he thought was right.
A: In what sense do you mean?
C: Look. I have tried to raise Molly freely. I didn't want her to be
ashamed of her body or think that it was something she had to
hide. I think Lee was just trying to honor that.
A: Well, I believe that, but I think we're going to have to down-
pedal this permissive business. I know, I mean, we both know
that it's probably healthier for a kid to be open about sexual
stuff, but I don't think it makes much sense to try to educate the
judge about it.
C: But if we explain how it happened, if we explain the context in
which it ....
A: Right. Well, we'll do that, we'll do that. But these judges are
very conservative. What they hear all day long is terrible stuff-
child abuse, rape, child molestation. After a while they lump
everything together in their minds. I mean, I can understand
how it happened and you can understand. But I can also tell you
how their attorney is going to present it and it's not going to
sound good.
C: So what are you suggesting we do?
A: I think we should focus on how happy she was with you, how
responsible you were. Sandy [the other parent] is a bit of a
workaholic. So it's pretty much a choice between a loving parent
and a paid baby sitter. And we'll let them bring up the sexual
stuff with your friend, but we're not going to defend it or tie it
into the idea of sexual openness or anything. It's just going to be
a mistake your friend made .... Well, sound reasonable?
C: Yeah-you mean, blame my friend. Right?
A: That's the strategy.
C: Oh, well that's pretty convenient, isn't it. We just find somebody
to sacrifice-yeah.
A: Do you see it another way?
C: I don't see how Sandy has the right to do this. I don't see how he
has the right to sit in judgment of my life like this. He doesn't
know Lee. He doesn't know how we live.
A: Well, I'm telling you how it's going to be.
C: So what if we told the truth? How about the truth?
A: Which is?
C: The truth is that ... Lee never hurt Molly. That Molly wasn't
hurt. Lee may have made a mistake, but he was just trying to do
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what he thought I wanted. It's Sandy who's got this all wrong.
It's Sandywho's got this all twisted around. And now you're try-
ing to make it sound like there's something wrong with Lee.
Something wrong with us!
A: I'll represent you in any way you like. But I think the point here
is to get Molly back and not to enlighten the judge on sexual
morality.
C: Oh, yeah... yeah
A: Are we in agreement on that?
C: Yeah, mmmmm.
The students were asked their reactions to the transcript includ-
ing their evaluation of the lawyer's interaction with the client. A few
students were somewhat critical of the lawyer's style in expressing his
viewpoint. A number of students, however, clearly expressed the view
that the lawyer was right in his conclusions and directions to the client.
One student went on to say that the transcript illustrated why people
go to lawyers, reasoning that otherwise what is the point of going to
someone who has been through three years of law school. Eventually,
through the guidance of the clinical faculty, the class reached a more
nuanced and multidimensional view of counseling and client decision
making. In the course of that discussion, however, a substantial
number of students expressed the view that the lawyer knew both
what was best and what was in the client's best interests. They also
indicated that they felt it was appropriate for the lawyer to communi-
cate those views to the client and direct the course of future action.
There was very little questioning by the students as to how a lawyer
would know what was best and more particularly how a lawyer would
know what was in the best interests of this particular client. In fact,
there was an unquestioned assumption by at least some of the stu-
dents that he would and did know. 12 We can only speculate to what
degree their assumptions and acquiescence in the lawyer's expertise
was affected by the students' general agreement with the lawyer's
judgment and evaluation of the client portrayed in the transcript. We
can also only speculate about the extent to which the unquestioned
assumptions made by the students regarding the client's objectives
and the validity of the lawyer's decision making as to the best course
of action were driven by their own established frames of reference and
patterns of thinking. 13
Another lawyer/client model looks to not only the client's inter-
ests but society's interests as well. In one variation of this model, law-
yers rely on their own moral values to determine society's interest. In
12 Observation of counseling class, Legal Aid I, Cornell Law School (Sept. 15, 1997).
13 Aiken, supra note 1, at 23.
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another variation, the lens through which society's interests are as-
sessed and weighed is the clients' own values. In the latter model, law-
yers help their clients consider how the resolution of legal issues will
affect the interests of others.14
The different models underscore the tension within the relation
of lawyers to their clients. Although they may vary in emphasis and
role, all the models are based on the expertise of the lawyer. They all
reflect a fundamental assumption that it is the lawyer who has both
the knowledge and power to determine the nature of the lawyer/client
relationship. 15 Understanding that lawyering is relational and that the
nature of the lawyer/client relationship is a core element in defining
lawyer identity makes it critical to recognize that the lawyer's view of
the client and the subsequent adoption of a particular model is influ-
enced by assumptions, biases, and stereotypes-whether conscious or
not. As Aiken tells us, patterns of thought control the way we inter-
pret perceptions and construe experience. 16 The law school norm of
competitive striving for expertise and the classroom norm of professor
as all-knowing reinforce the acceptance of lawyers as experts in rela-
tionship to their clients.' 7 The prevailing norms within legal education
are inconsistent with students learning that the limited nature of their
perspectives constrains their ability to represent clients in a fully com-
petent manner.
Law Schools and Clients
We have seen how nonclinical and clinical education merge for
students around the issue of lawyer as expert and how that is part of a
14 See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT E. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILrrY 116-29 (1994). Shaffer and Cochran analyze the way lawyers ap-
proach moral issues with clients by asking two questions: (1) Who controls the representa-
tion? and (2) Are the interests of those other than the client important? They identify four
approaches to moral choices confronted in the lawyer/client relationship: lawyer as godfa-
ther-where the lawyer makes choices for the client that the lawyer thinks will serve the
interests of the client without regard for the interests of others; lawyer as hired gun-
where the client controls the choices and the lawyer accepts no responsibility for injury to
others; lawyer as guru-where the lawyer makes the choices for the client with considera-
tion for others and concern that the client do the right thing; and finally lawyer as friend-
where the lawyer and client struggle together and resolve the issues such that the concerns
of the client as well as others are taken into account and the client becomes a better per-
son. Id. at 3-4.
15 It is important to keep in mind that just as lawyers and law students differ with
regard to their relative positions in society with respect to exercising privilege and power,
see Aiken, supra note 1, clients too may differ in regard to their exercise of power within
the lawyer/client relationship. The president or chief executive officer of a multi-billion
dollar corporation is not in the same relational position toward her/his lawyer as the person
of limited economic means.
16 Aiken, supra note 1, at 23.
17 See infra pp. 139-41.
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broader issue of the relationship between lawyer and client. These two
issues are made even more complex when we consider the relation-
ship of clients to the law school. In the clinical setting, the client is
viewed as not only the client of the student but also the client of the
clinical faculty or supervising attorney. Both student and clinical
faculty have the obligation to serve the client and engage in lawyering
to resolve problems. Although the roles of student and clinical faculty
differ, both recognize their ultimate obligation to the client. I would
venture to say that this is a typical view of the client's relationships
within the law school clinical setting.
What is missing from this model, however, is the law school's ob-
ligation to the clients we invite to come through bur doors. The rela-
tionships created are not so confined as the predominant law school
structure would have us assume. By inviting clients into the institution
to both be served by the clinic and serve as a learning opportunity for
students, the law school-as an educational institution-takes on an
obligation to the client. Would embracing, rather than ignoring, this
relationship change the nature of legal education? If the client were
explicitly seen as the client of the law school, the institution's respon-
sibility to ensure competent, skillful and ethical representation by stu-
dents through its classroom and clinical teaching would be
unavoidable. Both curricular decisions and course content would be
enhanced as well as constrained by an understanding that a law school
cannot meet its obligation exclusively through the hiring and retention
of high-quality clinical teachers, but must hold all persons in -the law
school community accountable for the delivery of high-quality legal
services to its clients.
Historically clinical programs have not been fully integrated into
the law school and this is still the case at many law schools. Currently,
the relationship between clinical and nonclinical faculty varies consid-
erably from school to school. At some schools the faculty are fully
integrated; at others, the relationship ranges from collegial to uneasy
to problematic. One obvious symbol of the relationship between
clinical and nonclinical programs is their physical locations. Many
clinical programs are physically separate from the classrooms and the
offices of nonclinical faculty. In some cases, the clinical programs are
separated to the point of being located in an entirely different building
and sometimes off campus.' 8 Not to carry architectural design too far,
the physical boundaries between nonclinic and clinic do seem to re-
flect the reluctance of law schools to embrace the clinic fully and to
appreciate the complexities of lawyer/client relationships.
18 One argument in favor of separate facilities might be ease of access for clients in
terms of building architecture as well as physical location of the building.
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What accounts for this reluctance? Would the resistance to inte-
grating fully clinical programs both physically within the law school
and pedagogically within the curriculum be as strong if the clients of
the clinic were not persons with little social or economic status? The
resistance to seeing clients of the clinics as clients of the law school
may be reinforced by the stigma and stereotypes attached to the
poor.19 It is an interesting question to ask whether that resistance
would be as robust if the clinical programs served a different client
population that more closely embodied the hierarchy of representa-
tion in the profession.
The existing dichotomy of clinic/nonclinic reinforces the ability of
law schools to refrain from admitting an institutional responsibility to
clients. By isolating and separating that part of the educational pro-
gram that serves clients from the rest of the institution, a boundary is
created that few feel the need to cross. By constructing this boundary,
the institution is safely separated from an obligation to clients which
might disrupt the clinic/nonclinic dichotomy.
Tere is also, arguably, an interest on the part of the clinical pro-
grams and faculty in maintaining this dichotomy. Separation, even if
imposed by others, need not be exclusively subordinating. It can also
create the space for a degree of independence from the dominant cul-
ture that allows for creativity and resistance. If the clinic/nonclinic di-
chotomy were eliminated, clinics might have -to share their
particularized pedagogical place and function.
Although recognizing that the clinic has a particular role in the
curriculum because it is the only place in the law school where stu-
dents come into contact with clients, we must also admit that the
clinical program is not the only place in the law school where critical
reflection and analysis of the relational nature of lawyering and the
law can take place. One view of teaching is that it is part of the aca-
demic enterprise of knowledge creation-both in what the teacher
brings into the classroom and in the dialogic act of teaching itself. Re-
cently, a whole new, critical scholarship in law has developed. This
scholarship reveals that abilities, class, ethnicity, gender, race, and sex-
ual orientation are not natural or biological categories that are un-
changing over time and across cultures. Rather, these categories are
socially constructed: they arise and are transformed in history.20 One
aspect of critical theory that affects the creation of knowledge is la-
beled standpoint theory-a view that "knowledge is and should be
19 See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79
GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991).
20 TERESA L. AMO=T & JULIE A. MATTiHAEI, RACE, GENDER, AND WORK: A MUL-
TICULTURAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (1991).
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situated in people's diverse social locations. As such, all knowledge is
affected by the social conditions under which it is produced; it is
grounded in both the social location and social biography of the ob-
server and the observed." '21
The theoretical developments that have occurred and that con-
tinue to evolve in critiques of the law and legal practice are rich
sources of insight and knowledge to be discussed with students. These
critiques of the law have profound implications for reflecting upon
lawyer/client relationships and they suggest innovative analyses of
legal issues and possible remedies.22 These shifts in legal perspective
that are developed and described in critical legal scholarship mean
that the educational enterprise offers a wealth of learning opportuni-
ties for students to examine carefully the role of attorneys in relation-
ship to clients, the limitations of one's own perceptions and
knowledge in assessing cases and facts, and the possibility of ex-
panding the boundaries of what it means to be a professional provid-
ing legal services and embracing the identity of lawyer.
The clinic is both in the academy and in the profession. By view-
ing the law school as an institution with clients so that it too would be
an institution that is of the academy as well as of the profession, the
structural barriers to teaching students about the rich complexities of
the lawyer/client relationship would diminish. It would not be solely
the clinics that have the responsibility to engage in this educational
enterprise but the entire curriculum. If such a responsibility were em-
braced, the clinic/nonclinic dichotomy would dissolve to the benefit of
students, faculty, and clients.
21 Susan A. Mann & Lori R. Kelley, Standing at the Crossroads of Modernist Thought,
11 GENDER & Soc'Y 391, 392 (1997). It is important to note that standpoint theories take a
variety of forms. Patricia Hill Collins sees standpoint theory as an interpretive framework
useful in explaining how knowledge remains central to maintaining and changing unjust
systems of power. She argues that standpoint theory "places less emphasis on individual
experiences within socially constructed groups than on the social conditions that construct
such groups." Patricia Hill Collins, Comment on Hekman's "Truth and Method: Feminist
Standpoint Theory Revisited": Where's the Power?, 22 SIGNS 375, 377 (1997). A second
important feature of standpoint theory for Collins concerns the commonality of exper-
iences arising from groups that are differently situated within hierarchical power relations.
She suggests that "groups who share common placement in hierarchical power relations
also share common experiences in such power relations. Such shared angles of vision lead
those in similar social locations to be predisposed to interpret these experiences in a com-
parable fashion." Id.
22 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW (1987); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991);
John 0. Calemore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Au-
thentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992); Lucinda
Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal
Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989).
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Law School and Professionalism
The issue of how to teach the complexities of the lawyer/client
relationship implicates the broader subject of how the law school
teaches students the values of the profession. Law school inculcates
the culture, attitudes, behavior, and values of the legal profession.23 It
may be the first contact students have with the myriad roles of the
lawyer and the values of the legal profession. The law school experi-
ence has a "profound influence on [students'] professional values and
their understanding of the practice of law and the role of lawyers in
our society. '24
Recently there have been numerous books, articles, and bar asso-
ciation reports examining what is viewed as a decline in professional-
ism. 25 The attributes advanced for the successful lawyer in the
profession mirror those characteristics fostered in the law school class-
room: adversariness, argumentativeness, zealotry, and a view that
"lawyers are the only means through which clients accomplish their
ends-what is 'right' is whatever works for this particular client or this
particular case."'26 These characteristics frame a series of dichotomies
that construct the identity of lawyer within the profession. The tradi-
tional concept of lawyer conduct includes the following: lawyers are
adversarial rather than collegial, competitive rather than cooperative,
rational rather than emotional, focused on winning rather than prob-
lem solving, and perform as amoral technicians utilizing their legal
skills to achieve their clients' goals. One side of these dichotomous
traits define what being a lawyer is; the other side defines what a law-
yer is not. These characteristics construct a boundary around the legal
23 The values communicated to students are not random but rather express a particular-
ized view of law and society. See KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 14 ("[A] lot of what happens
is the inculcation through the formal curriculum and the classroom experience of a set of
political attitudes toward the economy and society in general, toward law, and toward the
possibilities of life in the profession .... Then there is a complicated set of institutional
practices that orient students to willing participation in the specialized hierarchical roles of
lawyers.").
24 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM
(1996) [hereinafter PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE]; see also Edward D. Re, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85 (1994).
25 See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 949 (1995); Phoebe A. Haddon, Education for a Public Calling in the 21st
Century, 69 WASH. L. REV. 573 (1994); Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics,
100 YALE L. J. 1239 (1991); Re, supra note 24; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF
COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986).
26 Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 7 (1991); see also Roger E. Schechter, Changing Law Schools to Make
Less Nasty Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 367(1996).
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profession and define who is in the profession and who is not.
Law school education contributes to the making of professional
identity and to the making of the boundaries that define that identity.
The culture and values inculcated within the law school do not sup-
port a vision of lawyering that takes into account that lawyering in-
volves responsibility to and relationships with others.2 7 The hierarchy
constructed in the classroom of the all-knowing, all-powerful profes-
sor in control of the students and in control of the transmission of
knowledge in the classroom is a model that is replicated in practice in
the lawyer/client relationship. 28 Needless to say, this model leaves no
room for standpoint theory. The acknowledgment of the tentative na-
ture of knowledge and the limitations inherent in the development of
patterns of thought that produce unexamined assumptions that Aiken
depicts is contrary to the model of omniscience that law students ex-
perience in law school and that traditionally define a lawyer's profes-
sional identity.
One aspect of lawyering and the concept of professionalism that
has received considerable attention as a source of dissatisfaction both
within the profession and from the public is the nature of the adver-
sary system and the abuse of that system by the legal profession.29
Sometimes referred to as the "Rambo" style of litigation, it is charac-
terized by contentiousness, hostility toward opponents and witnesses,
incivility, and a view of litigation as a game.30 One might ask whether
these characteristics are fostered in the work setting and practice
rather than the law school. Although it is true that the norms of prac-
tice influence methods of practice and litigation, it is also true that the
law school curriculum focuses on the adversary system. Trained to
"think like a lawyer" through the medium of appellate cases early in
their law school careers, students are imbued with the notion that liti-
gation is the primary method of resolving disputes. Litigation and a
winning result are the marks of the successful lawyer. Many scholars
have commented that the law school curriculum and the culture cre-
ated in the traditional classroom support and encourage adversariness,
competition, and argumentativeness. 31 Further, the professional iden-
tity constructed as part of law school culture teaches students that
lawyers constitute an ethical community of autonomous experts
who contribute to the maintenance of a rational social order. This
27 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 26, at 7.
28 Id. at 8.
29 See Re, supra note 24, at 91.
30 Id.; see also Schechter, supra note 26, at 379.
31 Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 26; Re, supra note 24; Schechter,
supra note 26.
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conventional view of lawyering assumes that professionals are in-
dependent specialists who stand above or apart from the competing
social, economic and political bases of power in society.32
The legal culture, constituted within the boundaries of the accepted
values of legal practice, helps construct professional identity.
The boundaries marking off who has the privilege to adopt this
professional identity and who does not have the privilege are policed
in various ways within the law school setting. Content and pedagogy
within traditional classroom settings play a major role in regulating
the boundaries that create professional identity. In a study conducted
at Harvard Law School in the mid-eighties with a follow-up study con-
ducted in 1993, Robert Granfield found that one of the ways the
boundaries of professional identity are maintained is through the
chastising comments of professors to students who make political, eth-
ical, or passionate statements in class.33 The professor's dismissal of
such a comment tells the students that they have attempted to trans-
gress the boundary. Even when professors are not overtly derisive, the
mere fact that the professor ignored a student's comment and failed to
validate it sends a message that the comment is inappropriate and
does not belong in law school discussions. As Granfield explains,
"[S]uch practices constitute a degradation process by which law
professors attempt to strip students of 'non-professional' conceptions
of the social world. Alternative paradigms are challenged as impracti-
cable since they would violate the ideology of professionalism." 34 In
most classroom settings legal issues are presented in an abstract way
divorced from history and context. Legal pedagogy concentrates on
teaching the application of so-called neutral and objective rules and
principles. Questions of justice and ethics are frequently excluded
from law school classes. 35 One aspect of the legal professional's skills
is the ability to utilize technical expertise in the service of the client. In
order to satisfy this professional standard, the students must learn to
divorce their personal values from professional ones. The law be-
comes something apart and detached from the rest of life. This ab-
straction and neutrality are central to the building of professional
identity.
Granfield's study also shows that much of the policing of the
boundaries takes place by students.36 Students who tried to expand
the boundaries of the legal discourse were ridiculed by fellow students
32 Robert Granfield, Constructing Professional Boundaries in Law School: Reactions of
Students and Implications for Teachers, 4 Rnv. L. & WoMEN'S STUD. 53, 54 (1994).
33 Id. at 61.
34 Id. at 62.
35 Cramton, supra note 31, at 249.
36 Granfield, supra note 32, at 64.
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for being naive, emotional, or silly.37 Such ridicule and disdain from
fellow students not only kept the boundaries in place but chilled any
further expression by students to challenge the boundaries. Within
this social dynamic, the legal issue-defined within a very narrow
frame-becomes the only legitimate topic for discussion.
Most of the law students Granfield studied internalized a per-
spective of detached cynicism. 38 The students embraced the cynicism
by equating it with intellectual development. The detachment felt by
the students is one of the central attributes of legal professional iden-
tity and so was viewed positively by the students.
However, students' detached cynicism comes at a price. Detach-
ment reinforces the inability to recognize one's own limited perspec-
tive and biases. Cynicism does not facilitate self-awareness or self-
reflection so that students will come to an understanding of how their
own values and assumptions are operating to the detriment of others.
It is hard to reconcile detachment, cynicism, and professed neutrality
with a commitment to social justice. The promotion of detached cyni-
cism is contrary to the need to develop and maintain passionate, nor-
mative values in the pursuit of social justice through the law.
For most of the students Granfield studied who were still con-
cerned with issues of social justice, the decision to enter large firm
practice presented them with conflicts and dissonance. Although they
still professed an adherence to their previous ideals, their career
choices presented them with contradictions that necessitated a recon-
struction and reinterpretation of the implications of their choice of a
career in corporate law.39 According to Granfield, this was accom-
plished by denigrating those students who actively and affirmatively
chose to serve corporate clients. By defining themselves as "not those
students," some students were able to reconcile their corporate career
choice with their ideals.
Granfield reported on a number of other rationalizations that the
students embraced in order to resolve the contradictions they felt.
One justification used to rationalize a corporate career choice was the
burden of student loans.40 According to Granfield, while debt was a
factor in influencing the student's choice of corporate practice over
public interest work, the possibility of leading an affluent life was also
appealing to the students.41
Another rationalization the students used to justify their job deci-
37 Id.
38 Id. at 68.
39 Id. at 73.
40 Id. at 74.
41 Id.
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sions was the assertion that they could be more effective in doing pub-
lic interest work within a large private firm.42 Granfield reports that
although a number of first-year law students rejected this view, by the
time they became third-year students they had accommodated this
shift in thinking. Part of the shift involved a redefinition of public in-
terest law. The notion of public interest law became broader for these
students, expanding from a poverty law/public defense framework to
include large firms that occasionally handled discrimination or em-
ployment cases. 43
Another influence on students' career choices is the overwhelm-
ing preference for large firm practice implicit in many schools' place-
ment activities. Most law school placement operations emphasize on-
campus interviews with large firms. In addition, the hierarchy within
the profession, which is reinforced in the law school, is that prestige
attaches to those who work in business and commercial law with its
concomitant monetary reward. One need only look at most law
schools' curricula to see that the second-and third-year course of-
ferings, stress commercial and business law rather than public interest
law. 44 The strands of curriculum, attachment of prestige to large firm
practice, and ease of access as a result of placement resources being
directed to commercial and corporate firms are interwoven into a
dominant pattern that directs students to stay within the prevailing
boundaries of the profession. To do otherwise, a student must over-
come many social and economic obstacles.
It is important to note that much of the research regarding law
school values and how students create their identities as lawyers and
develop their beliefs about legal practice are based on studies of the
Harvard Law School and its students and graduates. 45 Although each
law school is different, it seems clear that many of the values and cul-
tural norms identified in these studies-e.g., narrow methodology of
legal instruction that replicates adversariness, focus of the curriculum
on business and commercial practice, emphasis by placement offices
on providing students access to employment opportunities with large
firms-are present at most law schools. Statistics show that the decline
in graduates choosing public interest practice is similar across many
schools. 46
42 Id. at 76.
43 Id. at 77.
44 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CoNTRAcr (1992); David W. Raack, Law
School and the Erosion of Student Idealism, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 121, 129 (1991) (book
review); Schechter, supra note 26, at 386.
45 ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS (1992); KAHLENBERG, supra note
44; Granfield, supra note 32.
46 GRANFIELD, supra note 45, at 5.
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As we examine and reflect on the culture and values of the pro-
fession that are constructed and reinforced in law school, we should
not be surprised that there has been a steady decline in the number of
law graduates pursuing public interest careers.47 Admittedly there is
no single cause for this decline. An individual's motivation and deci-
sion making process are complex and can reflect inconsistencies and
ambivalence. This decision making takes place, however, within a sys-
tem that supports a prevailing, traditional framework of lawyer pro-
fessionalism. The boundaries are marked and students are taught that
a price will be paid if they try to expand or transgress them. The
boundaries are enforced by faculty, other students, the structure of
the curriculum, and the hierarchical nature of the profession.
The values and norms that the majority of law students appar-
ently have accepted reinforce the separation of law from the full range
of human experiences and activity. These norms that frame the
boundaries of the legal profession lead to the adoption of a profes-
sional identity that becomes more narrow as lawyering serves ever
more narrow ends. The notion of the neutrality of the law allows stu-
dents to rationalize away their complicity in furthering the status quo
at the cost of economic exploitation and subordination of those per-
sons whom legal rules render invisible. The narrow framework within
which professional identity resides means that representation will not
take into account a multiplicity of viewpoints. The value of pursuing
social justice is shifted from the core of professional identity to, at
best, the margin.
Professionalism Revisited
As concerns about the values and norms of the profession have
multiplied, the call for a renewed commitment to professionalism has
grown within the legal profession itself. This has led to an examination
of the elements that should comprise a definition of professionalism
and professional identity. In its latest study of professionalism, the
American Bar Association has defined a professional lawyer as fol-
lows: "A professional lawyer is an expert in law pursuing a learned art
in service to clients and in the spirit of public service; and engaging in
these pursuits as part of a common calling to promote justice and pub-
lic good."'48 The ABA report goes on to list the essential characteris-
tics of the professional lawyer, which include "dedication to justice
and the public good."' 49 Although justice is not further defined, and
47 Id.; see also ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT: THE FATE OF PUB-
LIC INTEREST COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL (Howard S. Erlanger ed., 1989).
48 PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE, supra note 24, at 6.
49 Id. at 7.
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although promoting justice is only an aspirational goal of the profes-
sion, the report attempts to reinforce an ideal of lawyer behavior that
many feel has been undermined by the increasing commodification of
practice and pervasive cynicism.
In an earlier report by the American Bar Association's Task
Force on Law Schools and the Profession (commonly known as the
"MacCrate Report"), similar normative goals are set forth as part of
the Statement of Skills and Values. 50 The Statement identifies the ob-
ligation to promote justice, fairness, and morality as a fundamental
value of the profession.51 I think it is fair to say that the MacCrate
Report has generated considerable discussion in the profession and in
the academy.5 2 It is also fair to say, however, that the predominant
focus of that discussion has been the skills section of the Statement of
Skills and Values rather than its values portion.53 It is worth noting
that the Report itself urges law schools to recognize the obligation to
teach skills and to stress the importance of the values of the profession
as expressed in the Report.
The Report also asserts that the promotion of justice, fairness,
and morality requires no resources and no institutional changes within
law schools although it does require commitment. 54 It would seem
that the Report's exhortation for law schools to adhere to and convey
the importance of promoting justice within legal practice is a rather
modest-if not illusory-appeal if at the same time the Report de-
clares that no reconfiguration of resources or institutional change is
necessary. The limited nature of the language expressed in the Mac-
Crate Report may be understandable given the complexity and wide
scope of the task and the breadth of recommendations made by the
Task Force. The limited nature of the appeal to promote justice ex-
pressed in the Report, however, is emblematic of the tension between
the values and norms set out as constitutive of professional identity
and the normative goal of promoting justice.
Even this modest appeal has not generated the kind of dialogue
and debate engendered by the Report's call to teach the fundamental
50 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM (REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NAR-
ROWING THE GAP) 135-221 (1992) [hereinafter MAcCRArE REPORT].
51 Id. at 140.
52 See generally Symposium, The 21' Century Lawyer: Is There a Gap to be Narrowed?,
69 WASH. L. REv. 505 (1994); Symposium on the MacCrate Report: Papers from the Mid-
west Clinical Teachers' Conference, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 349 (1994); THE MACCRATE REPORT:
BUILDING THE EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 2 (Joan Howland
& William H. Lindberg eds., 1994).
53 See sources cited in note 52 supra.
54 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 50, at 236.
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lawyering skills needed for competent representation. Fundamental
change would have to occur in order to meet the MacCrate Report's
entreaty to elevate the level of professionalism through a recommit-
ment to the value of promoting justice. I would argue that the reluc-
tance to engage the call for promoting justice is itself evidence of what
all of us in the legal profession know is at stake-our identity as law-
yers. The resistance to such change is not surprising because it entails
a redefinition of professional identity and a remaking of the bounda-
ries that constitute 'legal practice and being a lawyer.
Conclusion
The systemic nature of the forces that hold in place the traditional
values of the legal profession makes the prospect of a fundamental
restructuring of legal education a daunting one. Both legal education
and the profession are embedded in values and cultural norms that
will not be disrupted easily. Given the structure of the traditional law
school curriculum, pedagogical method, and culture, all of which con-
struct the prevailing boundaries in service to the status quo, the ques-
tion to be asked is whether one can create a "professional" school that
disrupts the predominant construction of lawyer identity and the
framework within which professionalism is defined.
It should not be assumed that clinicians, by virtue of being clini-
cians, are free of the constructed boundaries. Clinical faculty are not
outside the profession and they are products of the predominant
mode of legal education as well as the prevailing values of the profes-
sion. Acknowledging the difficulties posed by interlocking systems
that reinforce the dominant construction of legal practice is not, how-
ever, cause for pessimism. Rather it is the first step in a reflective pro-
cess that will allow us to embark on an effort to reconfigure those
boundaries and reconstruct professional identity. It is also the first
step in teaching our students, both in clinic and nonclinic settings, to
be aware of each person's limited perspective and each person's expe-
rience of both privilege and penalty. 55 The act of maximizing disori-
enting moments described by Aiken is part of the process of
disrupting the paradigm of lawyer as expert. It is only by destabilizing
the predominant norms and dichotomies of clinical/nonclincal and
professional/nonprofessional that we will begin to expand narrow
boundaries and reconstruct lawyer identity. Perhaps then all of us in
the law school and legal community can begin efforts to engage col-
laboratively in the pursuit of justice as constitutive of professional
identity.
55 COLLINS, supra note 1.
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